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 The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax* 
 DAWN JOHNSEN & WALTER DELLINGER† 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic inequality threatens America’s constitutional democracy. Beyond ob-
vious harms to our nation’s social fabric and people’s lives, soaring economic 
inequality translates into political inequality and corrodes democratic institutions and 
values. The coincident, relentless rise of money in politics exacerbates the problem. 
As elected officials and candidates meet skyrocketing campaign costs by devoting 
more and more time to political fundraising—and independent expenditures mush-
room—Americans lose faith and withdraw from a system widely perceived as be-
holden to wealthy individuals and corporate interests.1 
The United States needs innovative approaches to help rebuild foundational, 
shared understandings of American democracy, the American Dream, and oppor-
tunity and fairness.2 Tax policy provides one central context in which collective judg-
ments about fundamental values help form national identity. We believe that a na-
tional wealth tax (that is, a tax on individuals’ net worth) should be among the policy 
options under consideration to support vital infrastructure, social service, and other 
governmental functions. Although not a new concept, a wealth tax may be an idea 
whose time has come, as inequality soars toward record highs.3  
Our aim in this Essay is to help ensure that a wealth tax is among the policy op-
tions available to Congress by challenging a common assumption that has unduly 
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 1. One flashpoint of those concerns is the U.S. Supreme Court’s deeply unpopular 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which held that federal statutory limits on certain corporate 
campaign expenditures violated the First Amendment. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Steadily increasing inequality since the 1970s has given rise to recent important 
analyses of the threats to democracy of a failing middle class and extreme concentrations of 
wealth. See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY 
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2018) (urging that constitutional interpretation recover core 
constitutional principles that support a “democracy of opportunity,” including an anti-
oligarchy principle that works to protect against grossly unequal political power based upon 
wealth); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014) (“[T]here is no natural, spontaneous process to prevent destabilizing, 
inegalitarian forces from prevailing permanently.”); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE 
MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 3 
(2017) (“The number one threat to American constitutional government today is the collapse 
of the middle class.”); id. at 224 (describing “a vicious circle in which economic inequality 
and the capture of the political system reinforce each other”).  
 3. See PETER H. LINDERT & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, UNEQUAL GAINS: AMERICAN 
GROWTH AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1700, at 219 (2016); PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 23–24.  
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harmed its prospects: the belief that the U.S. Constitution effectively makes a na-
tional wealth tax impossible. We believe this conventional wisdom is wrong and its 
casual repetition has been harmful. Devising a progressive tax system that effectively 
taxes the wealthy is notoriously difficult,4 but whether a wealth tax is part of that 
system should depend upon the policy choices of democratically elected representa-
tives, not faulty constitutional understandings. 
Specific proposals have varied greatly. To take one example, Donald Trump’s 
first proposal of his 1999 exploratory presidential campaign called for a national 
wealth tax: a one-time tax of 14.25% on net worth above $10 million, which he cal-
culated would eliminate the national debt.5 Proposals more commonly recommend a 
much smaller, annual tax on an individual taxpayer’s net worth in excess of some 
large minimum.6 
We take no position on the details or desirability of any particular policy, but we 
note a few generally relevant facts about economic inequality in the United States:  
 
 The wealthiest 1% of Americans possess an estimated 42% of household 
wealth.7  
 The sharp growth in wealth disparity over the last three decades was driven 
mainly by the top 0.1% (net worth in excess of $20 million), whose share of 
national wealth has tripled to 22% in less than two generations.8  
 The soaring wealth disparity disproportionately harms racial minorities: the 
median net worth of a white household ($141,900) is thirteen times that of 
the median black household ($11,000). 9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See generally AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: 
LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929 (2013) (discussing 
taxation policy in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 5. Adam Nagourney, Trump Proposes Clearing Nation's Debt at Expense of the Rich, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/10/us/trump-proposes-
clearing-nation-s-debt-at-expense-of-the-rich.html [https://perma.cc/ZY3K-UD6C]. 
 6. E.g., Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Why (and How) To Tax the Super-Rich, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/20/opinion/la-oe-ackerman-
wealth-tax-20110920 [https://perma.cc/XK7K-2XNE] (“We propose a 2% annual wealth tax 
on households owning more than $7.2 million in net assets. Such a tax would target the 0.5% 
of Americans at the top of the pyramid, and would yield at least $70 billion a year.”); Daniel 
Altman, To Reduce Inequality, Tax Wealth, Not Income, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/opinion/to-reduce-inequality-tax-wealth-not-income.html 
[https://perma.cc/LJ44-6MWB] (proposing replacing the income tax with a wealth tax, with 
progressive rates beginning at $500,000); Ronald McKinnon The Conservative Case for a 
Wealth Tax, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240 
52970203462304577139232881346686 [https://perma.cc/5URF-DL5D] (proposing a flat 3% 
tax on wealth in excess of $3 million). 
 7. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016). 
 8. An analysis of wealth from 1913 through 2012 in the United States found that the 
share of wealth of the top 0.1% grew from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012 (including just 160,000 
tax units each with net worth in excess of $20 million). Id. at 520. 
 9. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic 
Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), 
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We also do not here consider what may be politically viable, except to note 
strong support among the American electorate for reducing economic inequality. 
Voters vital to President Trump’s victory, for example, favored raising taxes on 
the wealthy.10 Even if current politics deter enactment of a wealth tax any time 
soon, a serious debate now should inform future policy and politics. 
French economist Thomas Piketty’s 2014 bestselling book Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century sparked important debate about economic inequality and 
helps illustrate the unwarranted chilling effect of constitutional concerns about 
Congress’s authority to enact a wealth tax.11 Piketty’s academic study of wealth 
and income concentration worldwide, with dire predictions of increasing inequality 
and harms to democracy absent governmental intervention, became an unlikely 
national phenomenon.12 A wealth tax featured prominently in discussions of 
potential solutions—but proponents and opponents alike undermined its prospects 
by reflexively repeating the view that in the United States, unlike in other nations, 
the Constitution effectively forecloses a national wealth tax.13 Piketty himself 
assumed that the Constitution would have to be amended and urged attempting that 
very large hurdle: “I realize that this is unconstitutional, but constitutions have 
been changed throughout history. That shouldn’t be the end of the discussion.”14 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession [https:// 
perma.cc/7RVA-9REG]. 
 10. Cato Institute researcher Emily Ekins concluded that Trump voters were best viewed 
in terms of five segments, with two segments (totaling 39% of his votes) key to his victory in 
notable disagreement with more loyal Republican voters about progressive economic policies 
traditionally associated with Democrats. These Trump voters favored raising taxes on those 
with incomes over $200,000, believed the economic system is biased in favor of the wealthy, 
and viewed money in politics as an important problem. EMILY EKINS, THE FIVE TYPES OF 
TRUMP VOTERS: WHO THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY BELIEVE 11 fig.4 (2017). 
 11. Piketty’s policy ideal is for the nations of the world to come together to create a global 
tax on wealth, which he describes as a utopian but useful device for more attainable progress. 
PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 517; see John Cassidy, Piketty’s Inequality Story in Six Charts, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/pikettys-inequality-
story-in-six-charts [https://perma.cc/K3Y3-Z5Q7]. 
 12. Capital in the Twenty-First Century became enormously influential—and also 
extraordinary for how little read it was compared to number of books sold. See Jordan 
Ellenberg, The Summer’s Most Unread Book Is . . ., WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2014, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-summers-most-unread-book-is-1404417569 [https://perma 
.cc/S5J2-LSBV]. 
 13. E.g., MICHAEL SCHUYLER, TAX FOUND., THE IMPACT OF PIKETTY’S WEALTH TAX ON 
THE POOR, THE RICH, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 13–14 (2014), https://files.taxfoundation.org 
/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_SR225.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9TR-674H]; Matthew Franck, 
The Constitutional Fiasco of a Wealth Tax, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2012, 11:47 AM). Some 
commentators note the constitutional problem but proceed with valuable policy analysis. E.g., 
Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures, 68 TAX L. 
REV. 453 (2014); David J. Shakow, A Wealth Tax: Taxing the Estates of the Living, 57 B.C.L. 
REV. 947 (2016). Others directly contest the constitutional concerns. See, e.g., sources cited 
infra at note 37. 
 14. Economist and Bestselling Author Thomas Piketty Discusses Wealth Inequality with 
Diverse Experts, NYU L. NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/thomas-piketty-
capital-twenty-first-century-economist [https://perma.cc/BD9R-DGBP].  
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Other tax proposals from along the ideological spectrum have been met with similar 
constitutional concerns.15 
As erroneous conventional wisdom goes, this instance is formidable, with origins 
dating back more than a century and since reinforced by judicial precedent, tax pol-
icy, and powerful economic interests. Its foundations, however, have been rotten 
from the start: an 1895 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & 
Trust Company, that was contrary to all authority when a bare majority announced 
it.16  
I. 
During America’s Gilded Age of industrialization, a brew of economic depres-
sion, historic rates of income inequality, and populist and progressive political activ-
ism led Congress in 1894 to enact its first peacetime national income tax, which was 
aimed at the wealthy with a large exemption of $4,000 (about $110,000 today).17 The 
next year, at the dawn of what would come to be known as the Lochner era, a deeply 
divided Court shocked the nation by holding the income tax unconstitutional. 
Pollock’s four dissenting Justices powerfully detailed the century of judicial prece-
dent and political branch practice to the contrary,18 which included a unanimous 1880 
Court decision upholding an earlier income tax to fund the Civil War.19 The nation 
roundly rejected Pollock less than twenty years later with the Sixteenth Amendment, 
but Pollock’s reasoning remains the source of the belief that the Constitution effec-
tively prohibits a wealth tax. 
We think it clear that the Pollock Court went very wrong in abandoning the un-
derstanding of Congress’s tax power that dated back to 1796. To summarize, in that 
year in Hylton v. United States, Justices who had personally taken part in the 
Constitution’s framing and ratification unanimously rejected a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of an annual tax on carriages, a tax akin to a national wealth tax in that 
it taxed a luxury property.20 The Court upheld the tax, which Congress imposed uni-
formly on all carriage owners, against a challenge that it was a “direct” tax subject 
to a special constitutional requirement that it be apportioned among the states by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2402–19 (1997) (arguing that certain 
consumption taxes, such as the flat tax proposed by U.S. Representative Dick Armey and 
presidential candidate Steve Forbes and the Unlimited Savings Allowance Act proposed by 
U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici, would constitute “direct” taxes that must be 
apportioned and thus as a practical matter are beyond Congress’s ability to impose). 
 16. Pollock actually came in two parts, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 
I), 157 U.S. 429 (1895) and Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). This Essay cites to the separate decisions when relevant, but refers to the two decisions 
collectively as Pollock for the Court’s deviation from the century of precedent and practice 
initiated by Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).  
 17. MEHROTRA, supra note 4, at 128. 
 18. 158 U.S. at 638 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Brown, J., dissenting); id. at 696 
(Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 706 (White, J., dissenting). 
 19. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
 20. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
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population. Noting that apportionment of the carriage tax by state population 
(rather than carriage ownership) would have been unworkable and nonsensical, the 
Hylton Justices interpreted “direct” taxes as limited to those to which the 
apportionment requirement justly and sensibly could apply. Over the next one 
hundred years, until Pollock, all three branches of the national government 
followed this approach and consistently limited “direct” taxes to capitation (per 
person) and real property taxes.  
Without any sound explanation or basis in law, and ignoring considerations of 
stare decisis, Pollock greatly expanded the reach of this onerous apportionment 
requirement to circumstances in which it imposed an insurmountable obstacle: 
taxes on not only real property but also personal property and income from real 
and personal property, as well as a comprehensive income tax that included income 
from real and personal property among the sources of income.  
Principled differences over interpretive methodology cannot explain Pollock. 
The best understanding of the original meaning of the “direct” tax apportionment 
requirement supports Hylton’s functional approach, which allowed Congress the 
flexibility to meet the nation’s changing needs during the great economic and 
social changes of its first hundred years—and which should allow Congress the 
same important flexibility in meeting twenty-first century challenges. 
II. 
We turn now to a close look at the Constitution’s apportionment requirement for 
“direct” taxes. Article I of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the sweeping 
power to tax that motivated the Constitution’s adoption: “The Congress shall have 
power [t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”21 
This authority extends to all forms of taxes with the sole exception of taxes on 
exports22 and thus unquestionably includes taxes on income or wealth. 
Among the Constitution’s principal intended effects was to shift considerable 
power from the states to the new national government by enabling Congress to raise 
revenue directly from the American people without having to go through the states. 
Indeed, the national government’s dire need for an effective method to raise revenue 
motivated the adoption of the Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation’s 
failed method of state requisitions. Under the Articles, Congress was limited to req-
uisitioning money from the states in amounts that were apportioned according to the 
value of all “land and the buildings and improvements thereon” within the state.23 In 
theory, states in turn were to impose taxes to raise revenue to pay requisitions. But 
the system failed in practice, to the point of threatening the new nation’s survival, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 22. “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 5. The Court has interpreted the Export Clause as prohibiting “both taxes levied on 
goods in the course of exportation and taxes directed specifically at exports” but not taxes on 
goods prior to export that do not discriminate against exports. United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 
843, 847 (1996). 
 23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII. 
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because the Articles lacked an effective enforcement mechanism when states failed 
to pay requisitions.24  
The constitutional question presented by the income tax in Pollock or by a future 
tax on wealth thus concerns not Congress’s underlying authority to tax—which 
clearly extends to taxes on income and wealth—but a separate requirement the 
Constitution imposes regarding how certain taxes must be calculated or “appor-
tioned.” Taxes typically are allocated without regard to state of residence. Indeed, 
for most kinds of taxes (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises”),25 the Constitution im-
poses an easily satisfied requirement of “uniform” taxation which prohibits Congress 
from discriminating based on state of residence.26 But the Constitution twice ad-
dresses a special requirement of apportionment for “direct” taxes. Contrary to the 
sensible requirement of uniform application, Congress must divide “direct” taxes 
among the states according to their population:  
 Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of 
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
. . . . 
 No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion 
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.27 
As Justice Chase summarized in Hylton, “A general power is given to Congress, to 
lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only on 
exports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely, uniformity and 
apportionment . . . .”28 
A great deal turns on the meaning of “direct” tax due to the onerous and, to mod-
ern minds, unfamiliar and bizarre nature of the apportionment requirement. The me-
chanics bear explanation. Where applicable, the total amount to be collected across 
the nation of the tax at issue must be divided among the states according to their 
population. Thus, two states of the same population would pay the same aggregate 
share of the tax, even if their inhabitants possessed grossly disparate amounts of the 
object of the tax.   
The one form of “direct” tax that the Constitution expressly names—a “capita-
tion” tax, also known as a “head” or “poll” tax, which is imposed on each person—
can sensibly be apportioned according to the states’ relative population. Indeed, that 
method attains the same end as the requirement of uniform application when each 
person is counted as one. What might seem a redundant provision takes on special 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States . . . .”). 
 26. The Court repeatedly has rejected invitations to construe “uniform” more broadly to 
impose greater limits on Congress’s ability to tax. See Ptasynski v. United States, 462 U.S. 74, 
85 (1983); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359 (1945); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 
83–92 (1900).  
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 9, cl. 4. 
 28. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796).  
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meaning, however, when considered in the context of the times and the original 
Constitution, which did not count enslaved persons as full persons, a point to which 
we shortly will return.  
In modern times, a hypothetical capitation tax is the only context in which this 
type of apportionment among the states would sensibly apply. Allocation by state 
population would be entirely unworkable—indeed inequitable and nonsensical, for 
the types of taxes Congress imposes today, just as it would for a new wealth tax. That 
is especially the case given that the people in some states are much wealthier and 
earn much more than in some others.  
Consider a tax on income or wealth. Think about Maryland versus Mississippi, or 
California versus Montana. The median income of a person in Maryland is nearly 
twice that of a person in Mississippi, and the disparities in poverty rates and wealth 
are even greater.29 A uniform tax would sensibly vary according to the taxpayer’s 
income or wealth, without regard to state of residence. Apportionment instead would 
entail dividing the nation’s aggregate tax bill on whatever is the object of the tax—
income or net worth—by the relative population of the states and imposing it 
unequally on taxpayers depending on their state of residence. This would unfairly 
burden residents of poorer states such as Mississippi by requiring them to pay pro-
portionately more than wealthier residents of Maryland, an inequitable result to be 
sure, and entirely at odds with our current progressive system of taxing higher in-
comes at higher rates.  
Consider a second example, a modern version of Hylton’s annual federal carriage 
tax: a tax on vehicles. Residents of Mississippi and Maryland happen to possess 
roughly the same number of vehicles per capita, but residents of Montana on average 
possess twice as many.30 A uniform tax would reflect the number (and perhaps the 
value) of the automobiles owned by each individual. If instead the automobile tax 
were apportioned among the states by population, a resident of Mississippi would 
pay far more than a resident of Montana for the very same automobile. More analo-
gous to Hylton’s carriage tax would be an annual luxury tax on yachts. Under a uni-
form application, the tax sensibly would be imposed on each yacht owner, but ap-
portionment of a yacht tax among the states by population would inflict great 
inequities on states with low per capita yacht ownership: think landlocked states 
compared to wealthy coastal states. 
The Constitution does not define what taxes are among the “direct” taxes subject 
to this sharply constraining apportionment requirement, beyond naming capitation 
taxes in one of the two provisions.31 The evidence establishes that the term’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. The median income in Maryland is $75,847 and the poverty rate less than 10%, while 
in Mississippi the median income is $40,593 and the poverty rate 22%. America’s Richest (and 
Poorest) States, HUFF. POST (Sept. 15, 2016, 5:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/entry/americas-richest-and-poorest-states_us_57db167be4b04fa361d99639 
[https://perma.cc/XP9U-RAS7]. For detailed data by state, see Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates: State and County Estimates for 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// 
www.census.gov/data/datasets/2015/demo/saipe/2015-state-and-county.html [https://perma 
.cc/ZQV7-2QD8] (last updated July 10, 2017).  
 30. Highway Statistics 2015, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2015/mv1.cfm. 
 31. It bears emphasis that a term’s constitutional meaning may vary from that term’s 
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meaning was unclear to the Framers themselves. James Madison reported in his 
notes of the Constitutional Convention’s debate of August 20, 1787: “Mr [Rufus] 
King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one answd.”32 
Writing of the lack of “any antecedent settled legal meaning” of the “distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes,” Alexander Hamilton said that it was “a matter 
of regret that terms so uncertain and vague in so important a point are to be found 
in the Constitution.”33 The Supreme Court repeated in 2012 what it often has 
observed: “Even when the Direct Tax Clause was written it was unclear what else, 
other than a capitation (also known as a ‘head tax’ or a ‘poll tax’), might be a direct 
tax.”34  
The confusion follows directly from the origins of the apportionment 
requirement, which was the product of political compromise, not thoughtful policy 
or economic theory—and certainly not any principled decision to limit Congress’s 
authority to tax income, property, or wealth. Specifically, this constitutional 
language evolved over the course of the Constitutional Convention as the Framers 
struggled with a desperate need somehow to satisfy both the Northern and Southern 
states on the issue that deeply divided them: the institution of slavery. 35  
The Constitution’s first reference to “direct” tax is in the infamous “Three-Fifths 
Clause,” quoted above, which addressed how enslaved persons would count for pur-
poses of both political representation and direct, per capita taxation. The resolution 
of the great dispute over whether enslaved persons would be counted for representa-
tion—with the North arguing no and the South yes—was to pair representation with 
“direct” taxes and count each enslaved person as three-fifths a person. This painful 
political deal, rendered obsolete by the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery, 
reflected the awful legal status of slaves, as real property and persons, and alleviated 
both Southern concerns about potential taxation aimed at slavery and (to a lesser 
extent) Northern objections to giving white Southerners enhanced political power by 
counting disenfranchised African American slaves in the basis for representation. 
The Framers’ lack of clarity about the constitutional meaning of “direct” taxes 
                                                                                                                 
 
meaning in other senses, as the Supreme Court and commentators often have noted, 
including in the course of interpreting the meaning of “direct” taxes.  R.A. SELIGMAN, THE 
INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT 
HOME AND ABROAD 533–34 (1911) (emphasizing the importance of distinguishing, as the 
Supreme Court regularly has, between “the economic and the constitutional” meanings of 
“direct” tax). The interpretive challenge in this case may be heightened—especially for 
those versed in tax policy—by the fact that “direct” tax and “indirect” tax have acquired 
economic and tax policy meanings that differ from the constitutional meaning of “direct” 
taxes subject to the apportionment requirement. See infra note 100.  
 32. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 350 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. in four vols. 1966) (emphasis in original). 
 33. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 641 (1895) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
 34. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 570 (2012) (citation omitted). 
“Poll” tax, used interchangeably with “capitation” or head tax, has changed in its ordinary 
meaning to include taxes imposed as a requirement of voting, in particular, taxes first 
imposed in the 1890s to prevent African Americans from voting. MEHROTRA, supra note 4, 
at 55–56. 
 35. ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 110–99 (2006). 
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actually may have served the goal of compromise on the issue that threatened to de-
feat the new Constitution and the new nation: the ambiguity could be read as best 
suited the reader.36  
Although commentators differ in their interpretations of the “direct” taxes appor-
tionment requirement, it bears emphasis that substantial consensus exists about the 
analysis we have described thus far, including: the limitation was of unclear meaning 
to the Framers; it was at least in large part a product of the Constitution’s “original 
sin” in its acceptance of slavery; and that compromise was central to the 
Constitution’s adoption. Furthermore, most (but not all) commentators are extremely 
critical of the Court’s decision in Pollock, recognize the practical impossibility in 
modern times of apportioning just about any plausible tax, and endorse some narrow 
construction of this limitation on Congress’s otherwise-broad constitutional 
authority. 
We agree with those who conclude a narrow construction is warranted. In reach-
ing that conclusion, we would emphasize, more than most commentators, the ap-
proach that the early Court adopted in Hylton and that the nation followed for a cen-
tury.37 Before we turn to this precedent and practice, we address one remaining aspect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Id. at 183 (“Nobody knew what ‘direct taxes’ were, how Congress would levy them, 
or who would benefit from the apportionment rule.”); SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 566 (“The 
only conclusion from the above survey [of mentions of “direct” taxes in the different state 
legislatures ratifying the Constitution] is that almost every speaker used the term ‘direct taxes’ 
in a different way.”).  
 37. Commentators provide impressive, detailed accounts of the origins of the “direct” 
tax limitation in the course of reaching varying interpretations, narrow and broad. Such 
detail is less central to our analysis given our belief in the wisdom of heavy reliance on the 
century of pre-Pollock precedent and practice, beginning with the judgments of the Justices 
in Hylton. In any event, space constraints of this Essay preclude detailed consideration or 
responses. We briefly describe here the valuable commentary we find most helpful. 
Professor Edwin Seligman deservedly remains a leading authority, SELIGMAN, supra note 
31, at 531–89, and we rely heavily as well on Professor Ajay Mehrotra’s fascinating account 
of Seligman’s role among leading tax theorists at the time of Pollock, MEHROTRA, supra 
note 4, at 97–140. Professor Robin Einhorn’s important history of taxation prior to the Civil 
War exposes the centrality of slavery. EINHORN, supra note 35. Professor Bruce Ackerman’s 
insightful and provocative analysis also focuses on slavery’s influences; anticipating 
constitutional objections to proposals in his then-forthcoming book, BRUCE ACKERMAN & 
ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999), he argues that post-Reconstruction 
“[w]e should allow the ‘direct tax’ clauses to rest in peace.” Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and 
the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). Although we are not persuaded to go so 
far, we agree with Ackerman’s more limited conclusions in support of the constitutionality 
of a wealth tax. Id. at 56–58. Professor Joseph Dodge ably contributes to the compelling 
case for a narrow construction—but we do not find convincing his self-described “middle 
of the road” position that “direct” taxes include not only capitation and real property taxes 
but also tangible (but not intangible) personal property. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal 
Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution? , 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 839, 842–43 (2009). Tax lawyer Alan Dixler authored a very helpful 
chronological report for a bar association detailing the relevant Supreme Court precedent 
and identifying the ways in which Pollock today is an outlier. Alan O. Dixler, Direct Taxes 
Under the Constitution: A Review of the Precedents, 113 TAX NOTES 1177, 1177 (2006). 
Last, but certainly not least, in a valuable series of dueling articles spanning two decades, 
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of the textual analysis that is a principal source of contention. The Constitution’s 
second reference to “direct” taxes presents a special challenge to a narrow construc-
tion. We quote it again: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”38  
We must assume that the Framers included the phrase “or other direct” 
following “capitation” for a reason. It follows that some potential form of taxes 
other than capitations fell within the definition of “direct” taxes for this 
constitutional purpose. Further, constitutional text may not be ignored simply 
because it was the product of compromise rather than thoughtful policy—even 
compromise inextricably infected by the evils of slavery.39 At the same time, in 
construing this unclear, undefined eighteenth-century text, we must keep in mind 
its inherent ambiguity given that compromise, and more generally, the great 
differences in the economic circumstances and understandings of that time. Instead 
of the current strong, complex national economy and taxation system, the 
Constitution was framed in an agrarian-based economy in which the southern states 
enslaved people as property and the taxation of individuals by the national 
                                                                                                                 
 
Professors Calvin Johnson and Erik Jensen kept attention on this vital issue, which Professor 
Jensen remarked “neither constitutional lawyers nor tax lawyers seem to care very much 
about.” Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 355 (2004) [hereinafter Jensen, Interpreting the 
Sixteenth Amendment]. Johnson reaches conclusions similar to Ackerman’s (though based 
on significantly different analysis) and would limit “direct” taxes to capitations and 
requisitions. E.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the 
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, The 
Foul-Up]; Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of 
Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Constitutional 
Absurdity]; Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal 
Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Purging Pollock]. 
Jensen provides the strongest (though we believe ultimately unconvincing) analysis in 
support of interpreting “direct” tax broadly and in line with Pollock. E.g., Erik M. Jensen, 
Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Matter Today?, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 799 
(2014) [hereinafter Jensen, Does the Sixteenth Amendment Matter?]; Erik M. Jensen, 
Jensen’s Response to Johnson’s Response to Jensen’s Response to Johnson’s Response to 
Jensen (Or Is It the Other Way Around?), 100 TAX NOTES 841 (2003); Erik M. Jensen, 
Taxation and the Constitution: How To Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POLITICS 
687 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, How To Read]; Jensen, supra note 15. Dawn Johnsen 
appreciates joining Johnson and Jensen in this debate. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 39. Professor Jensen, a dogged and thoughtful proponent of a broad construction, 
emphasizes both of these good points throughout his articles and in particular in criticizing 
Professor Johnson and Professor Ackerman, some of whose statements invite such criticism. 
E.g., Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 37, at 374–77 (arguing that 
the unfortunate context of the drafting of the “direct” tax clauses does not negate their 
validity); id. at 374–75 (disagreeing with Ackerman’s statement that given the 
Reconstruction Amendments, “there is no longer a constitutional point in enforcing a lapsed 
bargain with the slave power”) (quoting Ackerman, supra note 37, at 58); id. at 374 
(disagreeing with Johnson’s statement that the apportionment limitation is “too silly to 
enforce”). See generally Jensen, How To Read, supra note 37 (disagreeing with Ackerman 
throughout). 
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government was a new and undeveloped concept taking the place of state-based 
requisitions. The potential “other direct” taxes need not ever have been imposed  
and need not be plausible today—indeed, Congress never has imposed a general 
capitation tax. But the potential for something other than capitations must have 
been contemplated, even if only vaguely and inconsistently among the Framers. 
The evidence suggests three potential “direct” taxes in addition to capitations. 
First, requisitions: Although Congress never has imposed taxes in the form of 
requisitions directed at the states, concern existed at that time that Congress might 
require the payment of requisitions past due under the Articles of Confederation. 
Unpaid requisitions were relatively large in some states, and apportionment would 
diffuse their impact among the states. (Under the Articles of Confederation, 
requisitions were apportioned among the states according to the value of real 
property.40)  
Second, “slave taxes”: Fear ran high in the South that Congress might find ways 
to use its authority to tax (as well as other authorities) as a powerful weapon against 
slavery, as evidenced by a separate constitutional provision that imposed a cap of 
ten dollars on each imported slave.41 The Framers were well aware that, as Chief 
Justice John Marshall famously would put it in 1819, “[T]he power to tax involves 
the power to destroy”42 no less than the power to tax is “essential to the very 
existence of government.”43 This second constitutional reference to “direct” taxes, 
which required use of the Census to count people for apportionment purposes, 
generally seems aimed at protecting the South from taxation aimed at slavery.  44 
The addition of “or other” may have been to emphasize that point—to guard against 
creative, as-yet unimagined efforts to avoid the three-fifths limitation and tax each 
enslaved person as a full person in something akin to (but arguably distinct from) 
a capitation tax. Beyond that, enslaved persons were considered by many to be real 
property, subject to taxation as such, and thus taxation of enslaved persons in the 
form of real property taxes also could constitute “direct” taxes subject to 
apportionment. In fact, Congress would go on to tax slavery both in the form of 
apportioned capitation taxes and apportioned real property taxes.45  
Finally, real property or land taxes constitute the third “other direct” tax that the  
evidence suggests the Framers may have had in mind—and the one the Court 
would emphasize in Hylton.46 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. See SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 554–55 (discussing addition of “or other” at urging 
of George Read of Delaware to prevent an attempt “to saddle the states with the 
readjustment by this rule of past requisitions of Congress”). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 42. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 
 43. Id. at 428. 
 44. SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 553–54 (“The southerners evidently feared that 
Congress, with its northern majority, might decide to make an arbitrary computation of 
population, and thus saddle the south with an undue share of taxation through a tax on 
slaves.”). 
 45. EINHORN, supra note 35, at 192–96.  
 46. See SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 566 (discussing references to land taxes as “direct” 
taxes during the Constitutional Convention). 
122 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:111 
 
III. 
We believe that no construction of “direct” taxes subject to apportionment by state 
populations is superior to that of the Supreme Court Justices who wrote in Hylton v. 
United States—a decision that brought to the question the near-contemporaneous 
consideration of several Framers of the Constitution and was consistently followed 
for its first century.47 The unanimous Court in Hylton upheld the constitutionality of 
an annual federal tax on carriages, which was enacted over James Madison’s 
objection that it was unconstitutional because it was an unapportioned “direct” tax.48 
The Court instead agreed with Alexander Hamilton, who represented the government 
in defending the tax,49 and upheld what can be seen as an early form of an annual 
wealth tax on a luxury property enjoyed by those with sufficient wealth to afford a 
carriage.  
The four Justices who took part in the Hylton decision all had participated sub-
stantially in the Constitution’s framing, as delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
and participants in state ratification conventions.50 They came from both slave-
holding and free states, south and north. They wrote individually, as was customary 
at the time. Taken together, their opinions adopt the principle that “direct” should be 
construed narrowly to apply only where apportionment would work in practice and 
not for any form of tax for which apportionment by state population (at the time, 
distorted by the Three-Fifths Clause) would not be sensible or just. Their opinions 
also identify in dicta only two types of taxes that they believed likely to satisfy this 
functional test: “capitation” taxes (as specified in the text) and “land” taxes (with 
some speculation about how far this category would reach). 
Justice Samuel Chase served on the committee that made recommendations to the 
Maryland ratification convention (and he had served as a delegate to the Continental 
Congress from 1774 to 1778). In Hylton, Chase emphasized that “[t]he great object 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 48. A fifth Justice, William Cushing, did not participate due to illness and the sixth, Chief 
Justice Oliver Ellsworth, had not yet been sworn in. 
 49. Surviving evidence of Hamilton’s views includes different constructions of “direct” 
taxes. In addition to defending the tax before the Court, in Federalist 36, Hamilton referenced 
taxes on land and buildings as “direct” taxes. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton). 
The Court in Pollock made much of the fact that in his brief in Hylton, he included a broader 
list of what he believed would be encompassed: “general assessments, whether on the whole 
property of individuals, or on their whole real or personal property.” Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan 
& Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 453 (1895). 
 50. See Ackerman, supra note 37, at 21 (“It came before a four-man Court composed 
entirely of Justices who had played central roles at the Founding.” (citation omitted)); Dixler, 
supra note 37, at 1177 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s first consideration of the issue, made when 
four prominent Founders were the participating members of the Court, represents the most 
historically valid and most sensible treatment.”); Johnson, The Foul-Up, supra note 37, at 75 
(“The extraordinary actors who decided Hylton were the Founders, so if the constitutional 
construction must follow the Founders’ intent, then Hylton represented the constitutional 
mandate.”). But see Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 37, at 379 (“The 
Hylton opinions are relevant data. The case is nevertheless overrated for many, many reasons. 
To begin with, I’m skeptical that the Hylton Justices knew the Constitution better than we 
do.”). 
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of the Constitution was, to give Congress a power to lay taxes, adequate to the exi-
gencies of government,”51 and he found the apportionment limitation on that power 
applies only “in such cases where it can reasonably apply.”52 The apportionment of 
a tax on carriages among the states by population would lead to “very great inequality 
and injustice” because, as Chase illustrated with hypothetical numbers, the amount 
of tax imposed on a carriage owner would vary by state of residence.53 Therefore, a 
carriage tax was not a “direct” tax in the sense the Constitution used the term. Chase 
reasoned that only capitation and land taxes were likely to satisfy that functional test:  
I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the 
direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a cap-
itation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any 
other circumstance; and a tax on land. I doubt whether a tax, by a general 
assessment of personal property, within the United States, is included 
within the term direct tax.54  
Justice William Paterson served as a New Jersey delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention, where he presented the important “New Jersey Plan.”55 His opinion in 
Hylton explained that the “compromise” limitation on “direct” taxes coupled with 
representation “radically wrong,” and “cannot be supported by any solid reasoning. 
Why should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented more than any other 
property?”56 The meaning of “direct” taxes, “therefore, ought not to be extended by 
construction.”57 He observed that the compromise was intended to help the Southern 
states, which “possessed a large number of slaves” and “extensive tracts of territory, 
thinly settled, and not very productive.”58 A uniform, per-acre land tax therefore 
would have been relatively more onerous for the Southern states. Application of the 
apportionment requirement even for land “is scarcely practicable,” Patterson noted, 
and the limitation should not be extended to other subjects less simple and uniform 
than land for which the uniformity requirement instead was sensible and just.59  
Justice James Iredell served as a delegate to the first North Carolina ratification 
convention. He concluded that “it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none 
as direct but such as could be apportioned.”60 He noted that the leading distinction 
between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution was that the latter “was 
particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases 
specified,” which weighed in favor of the application of taxes uniformly on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 173. 
 52. Id. at 174. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 175. 
 55. This was one of two original proposals for how to determine representation in 
Congress: the “New Jersey Plan” called for equal representation for the states in Congress, 
and the competing “Virginia Plan,” presented by James Madison, called for representation 
based on population. 
 56. Id. at 178. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 177. 
 59. Id. at 180.  
 60. Id. at 181. 
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individuals.61 An otherwise “arbitrary method of taxing different states differently” 
would lead to “dangerous consequences” that seemed “utterly irreconcilable” and 
“altogether destructive of the notion of a common interest, upon which the very 
principles of the Constitution are founded.”62 
Justice James Wilson served as a delegate from Pennsylvania to the Constitutional 
Convention and a member of the Committee of Five (the Committee of Detail) which 
played a critical role in the Constitution’s drafting. He presented the case for ratifi-
cation to the Pennsylvania ratification convention. Wilson wrote briefly in Hylton to 
say only that his views had not changed since he had opined as a circuit court judge 
that the carriage tax was not a direct tax.63  
It would be difficult to improve upon these four Justices’ collective judgment, 
which reflected, perhaps even beyond what they wrote, their roles in the constitu-
tional framing and, further, the views of other Framers on this very question as con-
veyed to the Court. Hylton’s functional test—limiting apportionment to that which 
can be sensibly apportioned—has been criticized as circular and essentially mean-
ingless,64 which is an understandable reaction, especially when viewed in the abstract 
and through modern eyes. We think Hylton’s functional approach makes good sense, 
however, against its context and history, and we find it entirely persuasive in light of 
all that followed. For a century, it proved durable and workable, as the Court and the 
political branches consistently adhered to it, and it remains sensible and workable to 
this day.  
Before its 1895 decision in Pollock, the Court never found any tax to be an un-
constitutional, unapportioned “direct” tax. On each of the several occasions taxpay-
ers brought such challenges, the Court applied Hylton’s test to consider the conse-
quences of trying to apportion the tax by state population. Typically noting Hylton’s 
identification of only the categories of capitation and land taxes (and variously de-
scribing land taxes as including land, houses, other permanent real estate, and en-
slaved persons), the Court upheld unapportioned taxes on income,65 on financial 
transactions,66 and on “successions” to the ownership of real property.67  
The nation’s first century of political branch practice strongly supports the Court’s 
then-settled view. Congress legislated in ways consistent with Hylton’s analysis as it 
enacted many taxes, even beyond those challenged in the courts, and followed the 
apportionment requirement only when enacting capitation taxes or taxes on real 
property or enslaved persons (whom many at the time viewed as real property). For 
example, in 1815 Congress enacted an unapportioned tax on numerous articles of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Id. at 181. 
 62. Id. at 183. Justices Chase, Patterson, and Iredell all further opined that not all taxes 
had to come within the categories either of “direct” taxes or “duties, imposts and excises.” Id. 
at 173–74, 176, 181. 
 63. Id. at 184. 
 64. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 37, at 361 (“[I]t’s 
counterintuitive to think that a limitation on the taxing power should apply only when it has 
no limiting effects.”). 
 65. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 586 (1880); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 433, 434 (1868). 
 66. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 533 (1869). 
 67. Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 331 (1874). 
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personal property (including household goods, furniture, and personal effects), and 
President James Madison signed it into law, notwithstanding his earlier constitutional 
objections to the carriage tax that was at issue in Hylton.68  
In its final decision interpreting “direct” tax before Pollock, the Court in 1881 in 
Springer v. United States upheld an unapportioned federal tax on income. The Court 
applied Hylton’s then-longstanding test, asking whether apportionment among the 
states would promote inequality and injustice and reaffirming that “[i]t was well held 
that where such evils would attend the apportionment of a tax, the Constitution could 
not have intended that an apportionment should be made.”69 Springer also reaffirmed 
Hylton’s categories: “[D]irect taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only 
capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate . . . .”70 The 
Court addressed the possible complication of Congress’s taxation of slaves as real 
property by noting that the Court never had considered whether apportionment was 
required and that it never would, “[s]lavery having passed away.”71 In addition to 
reviewing Hylton and its progeny and the Hylton Justices’ central roles in the consti-
tutional framing, the Court found that “great weight” was due to the consistent 
longstanding practice of the political branches and noted the unanimous concurrence 
of leading constitutional scholars, all in support of the Court’s consistent interpreta-
tion.72 
IV. 
Under the Court’s reasoning in Hylton through Springer, and as applied during 
those years by Congress, a general tax on wealth measured by net worth would not 
be a “direct” tax, either as a functional or a categorical matter. Hylton’s functional 
principle, which we believe reflects the correct understanding of “direct” tax, asks 
whether a wealth tax could be apportioned sensibly and whether the results would be 
just and equitable. Clearly, the answer is no. Apportionment of a wealth tax on net 
worth among the states according to population, as the Court said of an apportion-
ment of a tax on carriages, “would evidently create great inequality and injustice” 
due to substantial variations in per capita wealth across the states, to the point of 
rendering a wealth tax impossible. To the contrary, the Constitution’s typical require-
ment of a uniform application of a tax on net worth on individuals regardless of their 
state of residence obviously provides the sensible and just method of allocation.  
Some commentators have argued that, because under the Hylton/Springer con-
struction taxes on real property (and slaves as a species of real property) were viewed 
as “direct” taxes, an unapportioned wealth tax would have to exclude real property 
from the various sources of wealth included in the comprehensive calculation of net 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 649 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  
 69. Springer, 102 U.S. at 600. 
 70. Id. at 602.  
 71. Id. at 599. 
 72. “This uniform practical construction of the Constitution touching so important a point, 
through so long a period, by the legislative and executive departments of the government, 
though not conclusive, is a consideration of great weight.” Id. 
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worth.73 Although this argument has superficial appeal, it is belied by both the gen-
eral imperative of a narrow construction of “direct” tax and the specific rationale that 
lay behind including real property in “direct” taxes that must be apportioned: to pro-
tect the South from “slave taxes” and per acre land taxes. If Congress were today to 
enact a tax solely aimed at real property, the great economic changes since the ap-
portioned federal real property taxes of the nation’s first century presumably would 
make apportionment impossible and result in a difficult conflict between the func-
tional and categorical tests. A general tax on wealth, however, would raise no such 
difficulty because it would be categorically different than a tax on real property. This 
is illustrated perhaps most clearly by the many Americans with most of their assets 
in their homes, often heavily mortgaged—many even with negative net worth thanks 
to “underwater” mortgages that exceed the home’s value. A property tax simply on 
such real property calculated on the full value of land and homes, as in many state 
and local systems, would differ categorically from a national tax on net worth in that 
the inclusion of real properties would not generate a tax liability to the extent they 
were mortgaged or a taxpayer otherwise was in debt.74  
V. 
In 1895 the closely divided Supreme Court took its radical, unexpected, very 
wrong turn in Pollock by holding unconstitutional an unapportioned annual income 
tax of two percent on earnings over $4,000, enacted by Congress the previous year. 
Although the Court purported to distinguish rather than overrule Hylton, it failed to 
comply with either Hylton’s functional or categorical test. An apportionment of the 
income tax among the states by population would have been absurd, unjust, and, as 
a practical matter, impossible. By finding the impossible to be constitutionally man-
dated, the Court doomed any comprehensive national income tax, and Pollock’s rea-
soning similarly would foreclose the possibility of a national wealth tax.  
The Court actually considered Pollock twice that year. Pollock I held that just as 
a tax on real estate was a “direct” tax, so too was a tax on rents derived from that real 
estate; the Court refused to recognize the difference (familiar then as today) between 
income and its ultimate source.75 The initial eight-member Court, however, divided 
evenly on the constitutionality of the income tax, which included many sources of 
income beyond real property. After reargument before a full Court, the 5-4 Court in 
Pollock II additionally held that taxes on personal property and income from personal 
property constituted direct taxes and that because income from real and personal 
property constituted a vital part (though not all) of the income taxed in the 1894 law, 
the entire law was unconstitutional.76 Taken together, the Court expanded the defini-
tion of “direct” taxes beyond capitation and land taxes to encompass taxes on per-
sonal as well as real property and beyond that, income derived from real or personal 
property. The Court went one step further and found that Congress could not include 
these sources within the comprehensive unapportioned income tax. Although the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. E.g., Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 37, at 389.  
 74. Ackerman, supra note 37, at 57. 
 75. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 429 (1895). 
 76. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).  
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decision left the theoretical possibility of a federal tax on some other sources of 
income, a tax on wages but not income from property was politically and 
economically infeasible. One sign of how unexpected the Court’s ruling was: The 
proceedings focused more on the plaintiffs’ argument that the tax was not “uniform” 
including due to the $4,000 exemption, but the Court did not resolve the issue of 
uniformity.77 
Much can be (and has been) said about the shocking deficiencies in the majority’s 
analysis in Pollock. Most striking, the Court failed to acknowledge the import or 
even the fact of its astounding rejection of a century of judicial precedent and politi-
cal branch practice.78 To the contrary, the Court used extreme language to assert that 
any other interpretation was entirely unreasonable.79 The Pollock majority’s remark-
able lapse in judicial craft is similar to the equally egregious and still more reprehen-
sible illogic of the Court’s opinion the following year in Plessy v. Ferguson, which 
upheld de jure racial segregation on Louisiana trains.80 When the Court fails, as in 
Pollock and Plessy, to execute its duty to explain its decisions through principled 
legal reason, that failure specially and severely undermines the weight a precedent 
deserves. 
The Court claimed, incredibly if not outright dishonestly, that it simply was adopt-
ing the meaning of “direct” tax that was clear to the Framers, writing in Pollock I 
that “the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the 
framers of the Constitution and those who adopted it”81 and in Pollock II that its 
interpretation adhered to the term’s “natural and obvious import at the time the 
Constitution was framed and ratified.”82 Contrary to its earlier decisions and the 
Constitution’s original meaning and core purposes, the Court cited federalism con-
cerns and found that the Framers through this distinction sought to preserve the status 
quo in the types of taxes employed by the federal and state governments. The Court 
mischaracterized the Constitution’s essential change from the Articles of 
Confederation and great purpose in empowering Congress to tax individuals directly: 
“[I]t would seem beyond reasonable question that direct taxation, taking the place as 
it did of requisitions, was purposely restrained to apportionment according to repre-
sentation, in order that the former system as to ratio might be retained, while the 
mode of collection was changed.”83  
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 532.  
 78. The Court unpersuasively distinguished Hylton, after dismissing it as “badly 
reported,” as an example of an excise tax and as concerning an income tax enacted during 
wartime. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 625–26.  
 79. See, e.g, id. at 628 (“There can be but one answer . . . .”). 
 80. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 81. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 573 (1895).  
 82. 158 U.S. at 619. 
 83. Id. at 619–20. In explaining the serious errors of this account, Professor Seligman 
wrote, “That the Supreme Court of the United States was misled by the counsel into an 
historical interpretation which is beyond all doubt erroneous, is deplorable . . . .” SELIGMAN, 
supra note 31, at 558. At the time of Pollock, counsel for both sides sought Seligman’s 
expertise and Seligman advised against making this erroneous (but ultimately successful) 
claim. MEHROTRA, supra note 4, at 131–35.  
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History has sided firmly with Pollock’s four dissenting Justices. Their language 
is extraordinary. Justice John Marshall Harlan read from the bench his lengthy, 
strongly worded principal dissent.84 He detailed the remarkable list of Supreme Court 
precedent and congressional legislation, all in accordance with Hylton, that the ma-
jority had jettisoned. He concluded, “I have a deep, abiding conviction, which my 
sense of duty compels me to express, that it is not possible for this court to have 
rendered any judgment more to be regretted than the one just rendered.”85 Justices 
Brown, Jackson, and White also wrote separate dissents to express similarly strong 
opposition. Complaining of the “submergence of the liberties of the people in a sor-
did despotism of wealth,” Justice Brown wrote, “I cannot escape the conviction that 
the decision of the court in this great case is fraught with immeasurable danger to the 
future of the country, and that it approaches the proportions of a national calamity.”86 
Justice Jackson wrote, “this decision is, in my judgment, the most disastrous blow 
ever struck at the constitutional power of Congress.”87 Justice White, who within a 
few years would be authoring majority opinions backing away from Pollock, con-
cluded his separate dissent:  
It is, I submit, greatly to be deplored that, after more than one hundred 
years of our national existence, after the government has withstood the 
strain of foreign wars and the dread ordeal of civil strife, and its people 
have become united and powerful, this court should consider itself com-
pelled to go back to a long repudiated and rejected theory of the 
Constitution, by which the government is deprived of an inherent attrib-
ute of its being, a necessary power of taxation.88 
In his insightful legal history of taxation in the United States during the years 1877 
to 1929, Professor Ajay Mehrotra positions Pollock within a critical transformation 
in the understanding of taxation.89 At the start of that period, taxation was considered 
a form of payments for services, which supported deeply regressive taxes that fell 
most heavily on those who least could afford them. By the end, taxation was more 
widely accepted as a form of civic duty that required those with financial means to 
provide progressively more of the revenue necessary to support desirable govern-
mental policies and functions. Pollock came early in that transformation, when many, 
including in the federal judiciary, feared changes in taxation as a harbinger of creep-
ing, undesirable, anti-American socialism. For example, Justice Stephen Field’s con-
currence in Pollock I expressed fear of government regulation and redistribution: 
“The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-
stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Four Good Dissenters in Pollock, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 
162 (2007). 
 85. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 664–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). A year later, Justice Harlan 
would dissent again, this time alone, in Plessy, the opinion for which he is best known. Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
 86. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting).  
 87. Id. at 706 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 88. Id. at 715 (White, J., dissenting). 
 89. MEHROTRA, supra note 4. 
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war of the poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitter-
ness.”90 Justice Henry Billings Brown responded in dissent in Pollock II, “Even the 
spectre of socialism is conjured up to frighten Congress from laying taxes upon the 
people in proportion to their ability to pay them.”91 The Court’s unprincipled deci-
sion came as a shock and was widely criticized in academia and political circles.92 It 
was consistent, however, with other pro-business, anti-labor decisions, at a time of 
intense industrialization and labor conflict.  
During the four decades after Pollock, commonly described as the Lochner era, 
the Court continued to issue decisions across a range of doctrine that reflected similar 
reactionary impulses and constitutionalized laissez faire economic theory to strike 
down many democratically adopted economic and social policies. Beyond the in-
come tax, the Court struck down minimum wage requirements, maximum hour pro-
tections, and limitations on the use of child labor, among other federal and state ef-
forts to protect workers’ interests and respond to national crises and challenges.93 
Professor Barry Friedman usefully identifies three phases of the Lochner era: the 
1890s, the years around the 1905 Lochner decision itself, and the 1920s.94 Friedman 
describes Pollock as a key decision of the first phase and notes that “Pollock aroused 
the greatest fury of this early period.”95 The Lochner era often is cited (along with 
Dred Scott and Plessy) as a cautionary tale of what the judiciary must avoid.96  
The Court’s well-known course corrections beginning in the late 1920s restored 
Congress’s broad power to regulate interstate commerce and deferential judicial re-
view of the economic policy choices of Congress and state legislatures. The fact that 
the Court did not similarly rectify Pollock’s broad expansion of the scope of “direct” 
tax is, in an important sense, an accident of history—paradoxically, a history in 
which the nation rejected Pollock even earlier and through the extraordinary means 
of a constitutional amendment.  
VII. 
We cannot know, of course, what would have transpired absent the 1913 ratifica-
tion of the Sixteenth Amendment, but the evidence suggests that the Court would 
have repudiated Pollock. The Court immediately began backing away from Pollock 
and rejected some of its core reasoning in decisions a mere four and five years later, 
including to uphold an unapportioned tax on the transfer of property upon death.97 
The Sixteenth Amendment’s exclusive focus on income taxes made special sense 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895) (Fields, 
J., concurring).  
 91. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 695.  
 92. MEHROTRA, supra note 4, at 130–40. 
 93. Constitutional scholars and historians have examined the Lochner era and what 
followed in numerous excellent works, and any standard constitutional law casebook rehearses 
the basics. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1389–96 (2001).  
 94. Id. at 1391–96. 
 95. Id. at 1393 n.33.  
 96. Id. at 1389–90. 
 97. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); see also Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899).  
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given that the Court consistently had rejected “direct” tax challenges both before and 
after Pollock.  
The erosion of Pollock through a combination of Supreme Court decisions and 
the Sixteenth Amendment helps explain why the Court has not felt the need 
squarely to reconsider Pollock since 1895, certainly not in a way that reaches the 
constitutionality of an unapportioned wealth tax.98 As Professor Joseph Dodge has 
explained, “Since 1913 the ‘direct tax’ issue has largely lain dormant, as the federal 
government has been able to satisfy its wants from taxes and duties that are not 
viewed as being subject to the apportionment requirement.”99 We would emphasize 
that the Supreme Court played an active role in facilitating Congress’s access to 
the revenue it sought by distinguishing Pollock to the extent necessary for the Court 
to uphold federal taxes against many challenges.  
Most relevant, Congress long has taxed the transfer of wealth at the point of 
death or gift, and both before and after Pollock, the Court upheld unapportioned 
federal taxes on property triggered by its transfer. Pollock relied on a distinction in 
economic theory between “direct” and “indirect” that turns on whether the burden 
of the taxes can be shifted or avoided, and litigants understandably seized upon 
this immediately to argue that Pollock’s theory similarly defeated estate taxes:  
Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden 
upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, 
are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect 
of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by 
such estates, and the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct 
taxes.100 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Just as the Court has thoroughly repudiated but not expressly overruled Lochner, 
the Court could do the same with Pollock. 
 99. Dodge, supra note 37, at 847. 
 100. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 558 (1895). The 
Internal Revenue Service currently uses a similar test and includes the following definitions 
on its website:  
Taxes can be either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one that the taxpayer pays 
directly to the government. These taxes cannot be shifted to others. A 
homeowner pays personal property taxes directly to the government. A family 
pays its own federal income taxes. An indirect tax can be passed on to another 
person or group. A business may recover the cost of the taxes it pays by 
charging higher prices to customers.  
The Whys of Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://apps.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes 
/student/whys_thm04_les04.jsp [https://perma.cc/R3H4-S4SE]. The Pollock majority 
acknowledged that the constitutional meaning might differ and required different analysis, 
but then went on to egregious mistakes in interpretation:  
Nevertheless, it may be admitted that although this definition of direct taxes is 
prima facie correct, and to be applied in the consideration of the question 
before us, yet that the Constitution may bear a different meaning, and that such 
different meaning must be recognized. But in arriving at any conclusion upon 
this point, we are at liberty to refer to the historical circumstances attending 
the framing and adoption of the Constitution as well as the entire frame and 
scheme of the instrument, and the consequences naturally attendant upon the 
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An estate tax would seem not susceptible to shifting and therefore, under this 
theory, a “direct” tax. The Court, however, rejected application of Pollock’s 
reasoning in 1900 in Knowlton v. Moore and instead reaffirmed an 1874 decision 
in which the Court had upheld an unapportioned succession tax on the transfer of 
real property.101 Chief Justice White, who had dissented in Pollock, wrote for the 
Court and returned to the view expressed in Hylton and its progeny that this 
economic theory should not inform the definition of “direct” tax:  
[I]t is no part of the duty of this court to lessen, impede or obstruct the 
exercise of the taxing power by merely abstruse and subtle distinctions 
as to the particular nature of a specified tax, where such distinction 
rests more upon the differing theories of political economists than upon 
the practical nature of the tax itself.102  
The Court also has rejected two other important aspects of Pollock. In 1916, 
Chief Justice White again wrote for the Court to uphold an income tax against 
charges that it was a “direct” tax because it reached not only income but capital by 
not allowing for its depletion. The Court there described Pollock as premised on a 
                                                                                                                 
 
one construction or the other. We inquire, therefore, what, at the time the 
Constitution was framed and adopted, were recognized as direct taxes? What 
did those who framed and adopted it understand the terms to designate and 
include? 
Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 558. 
 101. 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900) (quoting Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899) 
(upholding a stamp tax on documents that evidenced certain financial transactions)). The 
Court similarly upheld an income tax on gifts in 1929 against the charge it was a “direct” 
tax on property, though with dicta that reinforced Pollock’s view of taxes on property:  
While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general 
ownership of property may be taken to be direct, this Court has consistently 
held, almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon 
a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property 
incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned, and it is 
enough for present purposes that this tax is of the latter class. 
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (citations omitted). The Court also noted 
that Congress imposed a tax on legacies in the very 1796 law that imposed the carriage tax 
at issue in Hylton. See Dixler, supra note 37, at 1182–88 (discussing various cases in which 
the Court has repudiated Pollock). 
 102. 178 U.S. at 83. The Court applied similar reasoning in Sebelius to hold that certain 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act were beyond Congress’s commerce power:  
To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and 
inactivity; both have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the 
distinction between doing something and doing nothing would not have been 
lost on the Framers, who were “practical statesmen,” not metaphysical 
philosophers. As we have explained, “the framers of the Constitution were not 
mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men, 
dealing with the facts of political life as they understood them, putting into 
form the government they were creating, and prescribing in language clear and 
intelligible the powers that government was to take.”  
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012) (citations omitted). 
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“mistaken theory” that had conflated income with its source.103 The Court discussed 
Hylton favorably there and in another 1916 opinion that unanimously upheld the first 
income tax enacted under the Sixteenth Amendment, but the Court did not take the 
next step and reconsider Pollock’s extension of “direct” taxes from real property to 
personal property.104  
More recently, the Court overruled another holding in Pollock that it found prem-
ised on a faulty theory of federalism that unduly constrained Congress’s power to 
tax. In Pollock I, the Court unanimously held unconstitutional the inclusion of inter-
est from state bonds among the sources of income taxed, citing federalism concerns 
that it found prohibited one government from taxing another (and similar to the 
Court’s faulty, new reading of federalism for its broad reading of the apportionment 
limitation). In 1988 the Court held, to the contrary, that Congress could include in-
terest on state obligations as part of a general income tax, and further, the Court ex-
pressly rejected Pollock’s reasoning that a tax on income is the same thing as a tax 
on the source of the income.105 
Unfortunately, the Court has not been consistent in its treatment of Pollock. On 
occasion, it has cited without criticism Pollock’s expansion of “direct” tax to the 
effect of contributing to a constitutional cloud over Congress’s authority to tax 
wealth.106 The Court’s 2012 Sebelius decision upholding a key provision of the 
Affordable Care Act provides the most important example. As usual, the harmful 
discussion occurs in dicta, notably in the course of the Court distinguishing Pollock 
and rejecting a challenge to an unapportioned federal tax. A lengthy quotation illus-
trates the consensus around the pre-Pollock interpretation and history, but ends with 
a conclusory repetition of the expanded Pollock definition which can be interpreted 
as undermining Congress’s taxation authority.107  
 Even when the Direct Tax Clause was written it was unclear what 
else, other than a capitation (also known as a “head tax” or a “poll tax”), 
might be a direct tax [citing Springer108]. Soon after the framing, 
Congress passed a tax on ownership of carriages, over James Madison’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112 (1916) (The Sixteenth Amendment 
“prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by 
Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which 
it inherently belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation . . . by testing the tax 
not by what it was—a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or 
source of the income taxed.”); see also Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (rejecting 
the Pollock theory that a tax on income from a particular source is the same thing as a tax on 
the source itself).  
 104. 240 U.S. at 112; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1916).  
 105. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
 106. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 570 (2012) (upholding 
a key provision of the Affordable Care Act as within Congress’s power to tax). 
 107. See, e.g., Jensen, Does the Sixteenth Amendment Matter?, supra note 37, at 817–19; 
John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal for a Constitutionally Apportioned 
Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (2014) (in an otherwise-strong proposal for a 
wealth tax, proposing the tax be apportioned on the view that Sebelius confirmed the Court’s 
view it would be a “direct” tax).  
 108. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 598 (1881). 
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objection that it was an unapportioned direct tax [citing Springer109]. 
This Court upheld the tax, in part reasoning that apportioning such a tax 
would make little sense, because it would have required taxing carriage 
owners at dramatically different rates depending on how many carriages 
were in their home State [citing Justice Chase’s opinion in Hylton110]. 
The Court was unanimous, and those Justices who wrote opinions either 
directly asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of taxation 
were direct: capitations and land taxes [citing the opinions of Justice 
Chase, Justice Paterson, and Justice Iredell in Hylton111]. 
 That narrow view of what a direct tax might be persisted for a century. 
In 1880, for example, we explained that “direct taxes, within the meaning 
of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instru-
ment, and taxes on real estate” [quoting Springer112]. In 1895, we ex-
panded our interpretation to include taxes on personal property and in-
come from personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of 
the federal income tax [citing Pollock II113]. That result was overturned 
by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes 
on personal property to be direct taxes [citing Eisner v. Macomber114].115 
The Court’s cursory final sentence does not fully capture the extent to which 
Pollock already has been undermined. Far from relying on Pollock, the Court typi-
cally has distinguished it and rejected its reasoning, almost always to the end of 
upholding federal taxes against challenges that they constituted “direct” taxes 
under Pollock. The Court’s final citation is to the notable exception to this post-
Pollock practice, Eisner v. Macomber, but again the Court’s brief reference does not 
convey the full story.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. Id. at 597. 
 110. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 111. Id. at 175, 177, 183. 
 112. Springer, 102 U.S. at 602. 
 113. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895) 
 114. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219 (1920). 
 115. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571–72 (citations omitted). 
The Court’s narrow understanding of the Sixteenth Amendment has many antecedents but 
contrasts inexplicably with the Court’s treatment of the Eleventh Amendment, which (like 
the Sixteenth) was adopted to “overrule” a Supreme Court decision . See Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In recent 
decades, a majority of the Justices have insisted that issues of state sovereign immunity 
should be decided not in the terms indicated by the text of the Eleventh Amendment but in 
light of the broad principle of immunity that the Justices believe the Amendment was meant 
to restore. We see no apparent reason why the Court should not treat in parallel fashion the 
force of the Sixteenth Amendment, its wording framed to respond to the specific judicial 
decision that prompted it but its force to be determined by the previous understanding that 
the Court’s decision overturned. There is a distinction: although there is fierce debate over 
whether Chisholm did in fact transgress a pre-Chisholm consensus, there is no debate 
whatsoever that Pollock abandoned without explanation a century of precedent and practice. 
A constitutional challenge to a future national wealth tax would provide an appropriate 
occasion to reconsider not only Pollock, but also the force of the Sixteenth Amendment, the 
circumstances of which weigh even more strongly in support of a broad reading than do 
those of the Eleventh Amendment. 
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In 1920, the Court made front-page news as it had with Pollock, this time by 
finding unconstitutional an unapportioned tax on stock dividends.116 The Court 
theorized that the tax reached gains that had not been realized and therefore fell 
within Pollock’s broad construction of “direct” tax to include a tax on property in the 
form of capital—that is, additional common stock paid pro rata as a dividend on Mrs. 
Macomber’s common stock in the Standard Oil Company.117 
 Macomber also came during the Lochner era, and we believe it should be viewed 
as compounding Pollock’s error. The four dissenting Justices, which included Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, took what we believe clearly was the better of 
the positions. Although they did not directly question Pollock, they would have 
upheld the tax under a broad interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment’s definition 
of income. Justice Holmes wrote that “[t]he known purpose of this Amendment was 
to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that 
most people not lawyers would suppose when they voted for it that they put a 
question like the present to rest.”118  
Although the Court has not entirely repudiated Macomber, subsequent decisions 
have undermined its analysis to an extent greater even than Pollock. The Court 
rejected Macomber’s definition of income119 in its landmark 1955 decision Glenshaw 
Glass.120 In finding that punitive damages (essentially a windfall) constituted gross 
income, the Court stated that Macomber “was not meant to provide a touchstone to 
all future gross income questions.”121 Macomber’s realization principle remains 
influential as a matter of tax policy, in that unrealized gains (such as appreciation on 
property) generally are not taxed, but it has become a rule of administrative 
convenience rather than a constitutional requirement. Although the Court followed 
Macomber’s reasoning in other decisions in the 1920s, as Professor Mehrotra 
explains, “[b]y the mid-1950s, with the case of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co., the constitutional logic of Macomber had been eviscerated.”122 In fact, several 
currently enforced provisions of the tax code would be unconstitutional under 
Macomber,123 which lower courts have recognized has been discredited.124  
The Court’s brief citations to Pollock and Macomber in Sebelius thus should not 
be read as support for those opinions’ current force. Sebelius followed the Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 117. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of 
Realization, in TAX STORIES 93 (2d ed. 2009). 
 118. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 207 (“‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, 
or from both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale 
or conversion of capital assets . . . .” (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 252 U.S. 179, 
185 (1918)). 
 120. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 121. Id. (holding that “instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and 
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” constituted gross income).  
 122. See MEHROTRA, supra note 4, at 370 n.41; see also id. at 367–72.  
 123. For examples of such provisions, see Ackerman, supra note 37, at 52; Dixler, supra 
note 37, at 1189. 
 124. E.g., Sakol v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1978) (Macomber “has been 
modified by subsequent decisions.”). 
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practice of distinguishing and, where necessary, rejecting Pollock’s faulty reasoning 
to the extent necessary to uphold federal taxes against challenges that they consti-
tuted unapportioned “direct” taxes. Pollock (and its partial revival in Macomber) is 
better viewed as an anomaly, fundamentally at odds with core constitutional princi-
ples and over a century of precedent and practice both before and after the decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Far from mere mistake, Pollock stands, along with other Lochner-era decisions, 
as a quintessential example of the Court grossly exceeding its authority on a matter 
of extreme importance. The decision was so wrong and contrary to national interests 
that it directly inspired a constitutional amendment, one of only three such amend-
ments in U.S. history.125 In stare decisis terms, it seems “a doctrinal anachronism” 
that reflects “obsolete constitutional thinking”126 and creates confusion and instabil-
ity about a core congressional power.127 Further analysis of stare decisis principles 
would fully inform whether, if faced with a challenge to a national wealth tax or other 
tax, the Court should overrule what remains of Pollock or further distinguish it. It 
seems likely to us that the better course will be for the Court to overrule Pollock and 
reinstate the Hylton/Springer construction of “direct” tax.128  
We end by noting a special harm of Pollock’s threat to a wealth tax that follows 
from the extreme economic racial disparity that persists in the United States. We note 
the terrible irony that would result if Pollock’s misreading of the “direct” tax appor-
tionment limitation—the product of the Constitution’s “original sin” in accepting 
slavery—were to hinder Congress in addressing a wealth disparity that today over-
whelmingly disadvantages African Americans. The wealth disparity is far worse than 
the disparity in income among races. An African American worker averages fifty-
nine cents income for every dollar a white person earns. The median net worth of a 
white household is $141,900—thirteen times that of the median black household of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. The other two Supreme Court decisions that inspired constitutional amendments are 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (the Fourteenth Amendment) and 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (the Eleventh Amendment). For a description 
of the very different approach the Court has taken to interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, 
without apparent justification, see supra note 115.  
 126. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–57 (1991). 
 127. One manifestation of that confusion occurred in 2005 when, following a firestorm of 
criticism, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit withdrew and replaced a 
very poorly reasoned decision about the scope of the “direct” tax apportionment requirement. 
On reargument, the government (during the George W. Bush administration) filed a brief 
urging a narrow interpretation of “direct” tax that essentially followed the Hylton approach. 
Brief for the Defendants-Appellees at 55, Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 
05-5139). The Court of Appeals did not take that approach, but it did reject the taxpayer’s 
argument and uphold the tax—unfortunately, repeating Pollock’s reasoning that “direct” tax 
includes real property and personal property. See Paul L. Caron, The Story of Murphy: A New 
Front in the War on the Income Tax, in TAX STORIES 55 (2d ed. 2009). 
 128. In 1943, the Court took another tack and rejected the government’s request to overrule 
Macomber, instead interpreting the statute to avoid the constitutional question. Helvering v. 
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943). Justice William O. Douglas writing for three dissenting 
Justices would have overruled Macomber. Id. at 409 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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only $11,000.129 The Court’s repudiation of Lochner and Plessy reflected improved 
understandings about economics and race;130 our understandings of economic 
inequality and racism today include recognition that this racial disparity flows di-
rectly from slavery, Jim Crow, and racial discrimination.131 
Shortly after his Pollock dissent, Justice Harlan included in a letter to his sons his 
deep concern about the decision’s impact:  
I never wrote an opinion about which I was better satisfied so far as the 
sentiments contained in it are concerned . . . . Just as certain as anything 
can be this recent decision will become as hateful with the American 
people as the Dred Scott case was when it was decided. That was the 
attempt of the owners of slave property to dominate the freemen of 
America and compel them against their wishes to sustain the institution 
of slavery. The recent decision will have the effect, if the country recog-
nizes it permanently as good law, to make the freemen of America the 
slaves of accumulated wealth.132 
Justice Harlan’s letter also noted that a few years earlier in 1883, “standing alone I 
dissented in the Civil Rights Case.”133 A year after Pollock, Harlan again would stand 
alone in Plessy against Jim Crow segregation, the dissenting opinion for which he is 
best known. Although the country heeded Harlan’s call to reject Pollock with regard 
to the taxation of income, which facilitated improvements in economic inequality, 
the persistent, enormous racial disparities in wealth leave African Americans spe-
cially the victims of Pollock’s improper limits on Congress’s power to tax. 
Although the Court largely corrected its Lochner-era errors that improperly priv-
ileged private property interests across constitutional doctrine, the Sixteenth 
Amendment obviated the Court’s immediate cause to correct all that was wrong with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic 
Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http:// 
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 130. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862 (1991) (discussing the Court’s rejection of Lochner-era 
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 131. Racial discrimination historically has been particularly virulent in housing, the 
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Pollock, even as it empowered Congress to impose progressive income and other 
taxes to meet revenue needs. Recent decades of worsening inequality and anti-dem-
ocratic influences of wealth and corporate power, however, threaten a new Gilded 
Age—and strengthen the imperative today to remove Pollock’s remaining impedi-
ments to Congress’s policy options in meeting twenty-first century challenges. Just 
as the New Deal Court allowed the enforcement of democratic protections against 
child labor and in favor of maximum hours and minimum wages, so should our gen-
eration reject harmful, unwarranted restrictions on congressional power. The wealth 
tax debate should proceed on its merits, unencumbered by a pernicious legacy of 
constitutional missteps. 
